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This is a critical review of the empirical literature on the relationship between violence 
and  economic  growth  in  Colombia:  an  interesting  case  study  for  social  scientists 
studying violence, conflict, crime and development. We argue that, despite the rapid 
development of this literature and the increasing use of new techniques, there is still 
much room for research. After assessing the contribution of the most influential papers 
on the subject, we suggest directions for future research.  
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Colombia is an exceptional case study for social scientists interested in conflict, crime, 
and violence in general. It is a country that suffers not only from a civil conflict but also 
from high levels of criminality, forced displacement, kidnappings and narcotraffick. In 
the last two decades economists working on Colombia have turned increasing attention 
to the analysis of the causes and costs of crime and conflict and the academic output is 
now  abundant.  Yet,  this  literature  is  almost  unknown  to  the  international  academic 
community.
1 The aim of this essay is to provide a brief review of the evolution and state 
of art of the research on the relationship between violence and economic growth in 
Colombia. We hope to be able to make the case of Colombia as an interesting case 
study  and  contribute  to  the  diffusion  of  this  literature  among  academics  and  policy 
makers working on the field of violence. 
  In writing this review, we have followed three guidelines. First, we focus on 
quantitative studies on the effect of violence of economic growth.
2 Second, we do not 
distinguish among works using conflict or criminality variables, nor we differentiate 
between forms of criminality or ask about their origins. The majority of the papers we 
                                                 
1 O n e  r e c e n t  e x c e p t i o n  i s  a  f o r t h c o m i n g  C o l o m b i a  s p e c i a l  i s s u e  i n  Defence  and  Peace  Economics. 
However none of the papers included in that issue study the relationship between violence and economic 
growth directly.  
2 A separate question that has also received large attention in the last few years is that of the economic 
determinants of violence in Colombia. Relevant studies in this field include Comisión de Estudios sobre 
la Violencia (1988); Gaitan (1995 and 2001); Sarmiento (1999); Sánchez and Nuñez (2001) and more 
recently Rodriguez and Daza (2011). Without denying the importance of this question, for the sake of 
space we overlook it in the present survey. For a short review of the determinants of violence in Colombia 
see Martinez (2001).   3 
refer to, focus on criminality figures. Still, some of them also use data on the internal 
conflict.  Crime  and  conflict  are  two  different  phenomena,  even  if  they  could  be 
interrelated  in  specific  contexts.  However  such  relationship,  which  is  in  nature 
complicated, has yet not been studied carefully.
3 
Throughout the review we will stick to the concepts used in the specific papers 
by  the  different  authors.  Otherwise  we  will  use  the  word  violence  to  refer  to  both 
criminality  and  conflict,  though  we  recognize  this  definition  is  also  problematic.
4 
Moreover, the concept of criminality is itself quite broad. It is sometimes associated 
with  the  homicide  rate,  manslaughter,  street  crime,  crime  against  property,  drug 
trafficking, kidnapping or a mixture of some or all of these actions. Again, we will use 
violence although we believe that a clear distinction of the different activities and their 
impact on the economic growth should be at the top of any research agenda. 
The third guideline is our emphasis on the rate of growth of the economy as the 
outcome  of  interest.  That  is,  we  abstract  from  the  long-term  relationship  between 
violence  and  the  economy  and  focus  on  the  short-term  relationship,  leaving  aside 
studies that have had as their variable of interest the level of output.
5 These are indeed 
very  different  research  questions,  as  illustrated  by  Figure  1.  The  figure  shows  the 
evolution of the real GDP per capita (left axis) and its rate of growth (right axis) for the 
period 1950-2005. After a short episode of negative growth in 1958 the country grew 
steadily (and with low volatility) until de mid 1970s. The rate of growth was again 
                                                 
3 An exception of this is Sánchez, Díaz and Formisano (2003), who use spatial econometrics to explore 
the link between crime and conflict in Colombian regions. 
4 T h e  World  Health  Organization ( W H O ,  2 0 0 2 )  differentiates  among  self-harm  (e.g.  suicide), 
interpersonal violence, and collective violence. While only the latter has systematically been studied by 
social  scientists  interested  in  civil  war,  the  study  of  interpersonal  violence i s  o f t e n  l i m i t e d  t o  c r i m e  
economists. Our revision of contributions in both fields responds to our personal belief that these have 
much to learn from each other. 
5 Also, we do not review studies that look at the effect of violence on intermediate outcomes that may 
have in turn an impact on economic growth. Indeed, the research on the transmissions mechanisms 
linking violence and growth in Colombia is rather scarce, one exception is Dinar and Keck (1997) who 
argue that conflict affects private irrigation investments in rural Colombia, and through that channel it 
harms economic growth.   4 
negative in 1982 but, in contrast to the rest of the Latin America region, then hit by the 
“debt  crisis”,  Colombia  rapidly  reached  its  growth  path,  albeit  with  a  perceptible 
increase in volatility. In 1999, an unprecedented domestic crisis made the Colombian 
growth rate hit its all-time bottom: per capita growth rate was almost -6%. After a large 
bounce in 2000 the growth rate recovered gradually. 
While the large changes in the growth rate of the economy have left they trace in 
the real GDP level, Figure 1 shows that the latter has increased steadily during the 
whole period, if fact the average income per person more than tripled during that period. 
 
Figure 1: Real per capita GDP and GDP growth, Colombia, 1950-2005 
 
Source: GRECO (2002) for period 1950-2000 and DANE for 2001-2005. 
 
While the present review might not be exhaustive, we have made an effort to survey the 
most important studies given the topic-limitations that we have imposed to ourselves. 
The empirical literature on violence and Economic growth in Colombia has evolved in 
less  than  two  decades  from  simple  comparisons  and  cost-accounts, t o   more 
sophisticated techniques and the use of specific theoretical frameworks. This coincides 
with the recent trend of the international literature, which is increasingly making use of 
modern techniques to grasp a better understanding of the dynamics of violence, crime   5 
and conflict.
6 Our contribution is then documenting the evolution and current state a 
research  agenda  pursued  by  economists  and  other  social  scientists  interested  in 
Colombia as a case study of a violent country. 
 
Violence and Economic Growth in Colombia 
Economists  in  Colombia  became  interested  in  studying  violence  using  quantitative 
approaches some 15 years ago. The first few papers were conceived as a reaction to a 
study  by  a  multidisciplinary  group  of  social  scientist  that  related  the  Colombian 
growing record of violence to variables associated with economic deprivation.
7 A few 
years  later,  in  1995,  three  independent  quantitative  studies  by  Gaitán,  Rubio,  and 
Montenegro and Posada questioned this hypothesis, which by the time was already part 
of  local  ‘conventional  wisdom’.  In  contrast  to  the  qualitative  approach  of  the  1988 
interdisciplinary study, the 1995 articles were at the time novel in their quantitative 
approach  and  should  be  identified  as  pioneers  in  the  empirical  analysis  of  the 
relationship between violence and the economy in Colombia. 
While Gaitán (1995) focuses on the determinants of violence incidence, Rubio 
(1995) and Montenegro and Posada (1995) do tackle the problem of its consequences on 
economic growth. We then exclude the former from the survey. 
Focusing on the 1980s and early 1990s, Rubio (1995) explores the correlation 
between the aggregate homicide rate (killings over 100,000 people) and GDP growth. 
The  author  concludes  that  the  persistently  high  homicide  rate  during  that  period 
prevented  the  economy  from  growing  2  additional  percentage  points  per  year.  In 
contrast,  Montenegro  and  Posada  (1995)  [hereafter  MP]  find  a  positive  relationship 
between the homicide rate and GDP growth at the regional level during the late 1970s 
                                                 
6 See Blattman and Miguel, 2010 for a recent comprehensive review. 
7 Comisión de Estudios sobre la Violencia, 1988.   6 
and the 1980s. The authors argue that the high level of violence during that period was 
the  result  of  the  rapid  economic  growth  of  some  regions  that  did  not  have  the 
institutional  strength  (e.g.  protection  of  property  rights)  required  to  transform  this 
growth into a virtuous circle of development without crime. In turn, the fast output 
growth created wealth easy to predate and disrupt. Rubio (1995) shows that the results 
of MP are not robust to changing the estimation period and provides in turn evidence 
consistent with the idea that more violent periods unambiguously coincided with lower 
growth rates. 
From a methodological point of view, MP’s findings come from estimating an 
econometric model in which the dependent variable is the regional growth rate and the 
main explanatory variable is the homicide rate. The latter is included both in levels and 
squared to explore potential non-linearities. The authors find indeed a non-monotonic 
(inverted-U)  relationship.  Their  interpretation  is  that  when  violence  reaches  some 
critical threshold, the positive correlation between crime and growth reverses and crime 
starts hampering economic growth. In short, the story that MP put forward is rather 
idiosyncratic:  at  lower  levels  of  violence  causality  runs  from  economic  growth  to 
violence: high economic growth causes violence to increase; however, when violence is 
high  enough  causality  runs  in  the  other  direction:  higher  violence  causes  economic 
growth to slow down. While such story illustrates the classic endogeneity problem of 
reverse causality, MP makes no attempt to deal with the identification issue. 
  On the other hand in Rubio (1995), the analysis of the relationship between 
growth and violence goes beyond the observation of simple correlations. The author 
investigates for the 1980s the relationship between the declining levels of Colombia’s 
total factor productivity (TFP) and violence levels, which increased during the same 
period. By running an OLS regression of the Colombia time series of these variables   7 
(controlling for the then high and volatile inflation rate), Rubio finds that the increase in 
the homicide rate during the 1980s was directly responsible for an aggregate growth 
loss of about 2 percentage points per year.  
Rubio explores a potential indirect channel as well and OLS-regresses aggregate 
investment  on  the  homicide  rate.  Controlling  for  more  traditional  determinants  of 
investment  decisions,  the  author  finds  that  the  increasing  homicide  rates  hampered 
private investment costing an additional 0.7% of GDP growth per year.  
The overall conclusion of Rubio (1995) is that, in the counterfactual situation in 
which criminality had not increased so much in the 1980s, annual economic growth in 
Colombia would have been over 2.5 percentage points higher. It is worth noting that 
this figure is very similar to the one provided by Collier (1999). Collier looks at the 
relationship between civil conflict and economic growth in the second half of the 20th 
century for a sample of countries and estimates that the incidence of war is associated 
with a growth rate reduction of 2.2 percentage points. How big are these figures? Note 
that an economy growing at a real rate of 2.5% will double its size in just less than 30 
years. 
Rubio’s paper inspired various researchers who endorsed his methodology. One 
example  is  Parra  (1998),  who  deepens  into  the  burden  of  violence  on  investment. 
Another is Cardenas (2007), whose motivation is actually the same as that of Rubio: the 
decline in TFP experienced during the 1980s in Colombia.  In addition to violence, 
Cardenas (2007) explores the role of inequality in explaining that fact. 
Parra (1998) regresses the aggregate investment rate in the second half of the 
20
th century on a number of variables including proxies of the cost of capital, a measure 
of economic activity, a proxy of aggregate human capital, and the (lagged) growth of   8 
the homicide rate as a proxy of the overall violence of the country.
8 Parra finds that if 
violence  levels  were  equal  to  the  Latin-American  average  during  the  1990s  (which 
implies a reduction of 75% on the actual Colombian rates), the investment rate would be 
50% higher, boosting economic growth. Put in another way, given the period-average 
share  of  investment  on  GDP,  a  reduction  of  10%  in  the  homicide  rate  would  have 
translated into additional 1.2% in the annual rate of economic growth. 
Cardenas (2007) econometric analysis is motivated by a comparative description 
of  Colombia  against  a  large  sample  of  countries  in  terms  of  size,  macroeconomic 
performance,  trade  and  indebtedness,  geography  and  health,  income  and  wealth 
inequality  and  population  fragmentation,  political  institutions  and  the  incidence  of 
violence. In such comparison Colombia shows up as an “average” country in all but two 
measures: economic inequality and violence. Colombia’s income-Gini (0.51) is higher 
than the world average; and the land-Gini (0.86) is one of the highest of the world. 
Moreover, Colombia is a world outlier in terms of violence, ranking first among 80 
countries  in  1995  according  to  the  homicide  rate,  with  80  killings  per  100,000 
inhabitants. 
Such comparisons motivate Cardenas’ hypothesis on the role of inequality and 
violence as obstacles for Colombia’s economic performance. The author runs an auto-
regressive model of the growth of GDP for the period 1950-2000 and incorporates year-
specific dummies  to uncover  potential  structural changes in  the country’s economic 
growth. He finds one such shift taking place in 1979: Colombia’s economic growth fell 
from an average of 5% in the period 1950-79 to an average of 3% in 1980-2000. 
Using a neoclassical constant returns to scale production function with human 
capital, Cardenas performs a growth accounting exercise to explore the factorial sources 
                                                 
8 The paper lacks a convincing justification for using the growth rate rather than the level of the homicide 
rate in a regression of the burden on private investment.   9 
of the structural change. The estimated Solow residual suggests what the author calls an 
implosion of Colombia’s TFP: During the period 1950-1979 TFP growth rate was on 
average 1.01%; in contrast, between 1980 and 2000 it was -0.95%. 
Cardenas’ hypothesis is that the productivity slowdown is explained by both the 
huge  increase  in  crime  and  the  growing  inequality:  On  the  one  hand  production  of 
cocaine rose from an annual average less than 100 tons before 1980, to more than 500 
tons in 1999 and illicit crops increased form 20,000 to 140,000 hectares in the same 
period.  The  homicide  rate  increased  monotonically  from  23  killings  per  100,000 
inhabitants in the 1970s to 41 in the 1980s and 62 in the 1990s. Kidnappings increased 
from an annual average of 44 in the 1980s to 3,706 in 2000. On the other hand, starting 
in 1980 the income-Gini increased steadily from 0.46 in 1982 to 0.53 in 2000, offsetting 
a downward trend that started at the beginning of the 1960s. 
Cardenas also explores potential transmission mechanisms. He argues that crime 
and violence destroy the ‘social infrastructure’ (a concept motivated by Hall and Jones, 
1999) and hence damage productivity by encouraging predatory behaviors that divert 
capital and labor to unproductive activities. To test these arguments the author runs an 
OLS regression of the previously estimated Solow residual on the homicide rate and the 
Gini coefficient, finding evidence of a negative correlation of both factors with the 
dependent variable. 
Cardenas (2007) was an influential paper among younger Colombian economists 
who  started  studying  the  relationship  between  violence  and  economic  growth  in 
Colombia  in  the  early  2000s.  One  example  is  Vargas  (2003),  who  distinguishes 
criminality from conflict-specific events and takes advantage of a unique dataset on the 
latter to focus, for the first time, on the effects of the Colombian internal conflict on the 
country’s economic performance. Previous studies had used the homicide rate, the best   10 
proxy of criminality
9 but poorly correlated with the dynamics of the conflict itself.
10 
Vargas  proposes  a  systematic  way  of  thinking  of  the  channels  through  which  the 
conflict may affect the rate of economic growth. He argues that in the context of a 
simple production function conflict intensity can affect the growth rate of output both 
directly,  by  shifting  downwards  productivity,  and  indirectly,  by  hindering  the 
accumulation of factors of production (i.e. both physical and human capital). Thus, the 
author develops a neoclassical growth model in which both total factor productivity and 
the accumulation of physical and human capital are affected by the intensity of conflict. 
To  quantify  the  impact  of  conflict  on  growth,  Vargas  estimates  by  3SLS  a 
system of equations using quarterly data from 1988 to 2001. In the first equation, the 
GDP growth is a function of physical and human capital as well as the intensity of 
conflict.
11 The second and third equations capture respectively, by using autoregressive 
processes, the dynamics of physical and human capital. Also measures of the intensity 
of the conflict are added on both equations. This strategy allows Vargas to capture the 
direct impact of conflict on economic growth (through the coefficient of the conflict-
proxy in the first equation) as well as the indirect impact. The latter is the effect of 
conflict on the accumulations of factors of production times the contribution of each 
factor to the growth rate of output, as captured by the first equation. 
Vargas estimates that the increase in the intensity of the Colombian conflict 
since the late1980s slowed the per capita economic growth rate in 0.3 percentage points 
on average during the 1990s. In particular the large upsurge of conflict activity starting 
in the late 1990s was responsible for about 1 percentage point loss in the per capita 
growth rate. Most of this impact (90%) is a direct impact via TPF growth, and the rest is 
indirect via the accumulation of physical capital. 
                                                 
9 E.g. Rubio, 1995. 
10 Restrepo et al., 2004. 
11 For this, Vargas uses different measures that go from clashes and attacks to casualty rates.   11 
While it appeals to a simple but formal theoretical framework to organize the 
empirical strategy, Vargas study has a major shortcoming that is common to all the 
papers reviewed so far: It does not address the problems of simultaneity and omitted 
variables bias. In this respect, the paper by Querubin (2003) stands out. The author 
exploits the panel structure of the available data (department-level variation over time), 
which contrasts with the dominant time-series approach.
12 The author takes into account 
the  potential  for  omitted  variables,  especially  given  the  lack  of  regional  data  on 
important economic variables; as well as the difficulty in finding reasonable instruments 
to solve the endogeneity between violence and growth. Because both the rate of growth 
and  the  growth  of  violence  change  over  time  as  opposed  to  most  of  the  other 
determinants of regional growth, Querubin argues that taking the first difference of the 
growth equation eliminates all the departmental-specific fixed effects. 
While this methodology solves the omitted variables problem for time-invariant 
controls, the reverse-causality issue is still at play and hence conclusions in this case 
also have to be taken with caution.
13 Controlling for other time-varying growth rate 
variables  (transfers  from  the  central  government  and  income  from  illegal  drugs), 
Querubin estimates the panel by GLS. His measure of violence is a three-dimensional 
vector  including  the  homicide  rate,  the  number  of  kidnappings  and  the  number  of 
actions  of  illegal  armed  groups.  The  three  measures  of  violence  turn  out  to  be 
significant at 1% and have the expected sign. 
According  to  the  results,  an  increase  of  10  percentage  points  in  the  rate  of 
growth of the homicide rate implies an annual reduction of 0.37 percentage points in the 
                                                 
1212 Rubio (1995), Parra (1998), Cardenas (2007), Vargas (2003) – MP’s approach is a regional-pooled 
OLS regression. 
13 While the author refers to his as a difference-in-difference (DD) methodology, this is really not so at 
least in the sense DD is traditionally understood in microeconometrics, i.e., one in which an indicator of 
the  treatment  group  is  interacted  with  one  of  the  post-treatment  period,  which  generates  a  natural 
counterfactual  difference  to  compare  outcome-gains  in  the  treatment  group  with.  Rather,  Querubin’s 
regression is one of acceleration rates (second differences) of the variables of interest.   12 
GDP growth rate. Similarly, the effect is 0.13 if the increase is on the rate of growth of 
the kidnapping rate, and 0.07 in the case of illegal attacks. 
 
Querubin  (2003)  is  the  last  paper  in  our  survey  that  looks  at  the  direct 
relationship  between  violence  and  economic  growth.  We  speculate  that,  by 
acknowledging the existence of potential endogeneity between the incidence of violence 
and economic performance, Querubin paved the road for the more recent generation of 
empirical  studies  on  the  effects  of  violence  in  Colombia.  Indeed  these  more  recent 
papers have focused on the impact of violence on specific mechanisms that in turn may 
affect economic growth, while at the same time making explicit efforts in making causal 
statements. These include the accumulation of human capital
14, the micro decisions of 
the productive firms
15, early childhood development
16, and the sovereign risk.
17 We do 
not review these contributions in detail because while the channels are made explicit, 
the  ultimate  effect  on  economic  growth  remains  speculative.  However,  These  are 
certainly topics and papers that deserve at the very least another review of their own. 
 
Discussion 
Since the mid 1990s the literature on conflict and crime in Colombia has expanded 
rapidly, being now one of the main research agendas of local social scientists. One of 
the  topics  of  this  agenda  is  the  relationship  from  violence,  broadly  understood,  to 
economic performance. While this particular topic was largely studied in the late 1990s 
and  first  2000s,  very  little  research  has  been  done  since  then  and  the  currently 
                                                 
14 Rodriguez and Sánchez, 2011. 
15 Camacho and Rodriguez, 2011. 
16 Camacho, 2008. 
17 Castañeda and Vargas, 2011. 
 
   13 
predominant research questions focus on different topics: the determinants of violence 
incidence
18  and  its  duration;
19  the  determinants  and  the  spatial  dynamics  of  illicit 
crops;
20  and  the  effect  of  violence  on  specific  channels  that  are  thought  to  affect 
economic performance (see footnotes 14 to 17). But the general point is that the last two 
decades have witnessed a boom in the economic analysis of violence and conflict in 
Colombia. 
  We focus this review on the relationship between violence broadly understood 
and the rate of growth of the economy. Nevertheless we believe that the final word 
about the effect of violence on economic performance is far from been said. Besides the 
fact, already mentioned, that all the papers surveyed lack a convincing identification 
strategy,  the  bulk  of  the  literature  has  focused  on  the  short-term  relationship  with 
economic  performance,  overlooking  how  violence  shapes  long-term  economic 
performance. Indeed, this is the variable more closely associated with the what is likely 
to be the main motivational driver of all these type of studies: sustainable economic 
development. 
We suggest that the future research on the topic has at least three fronts with 
large potential room for contribution: thinking of clever identification strategies that 
allow causal inference statements on the relationship between violence and economic 
performance; linking the channels identified as conflict affected and that are likely to 
have an impact on economic performance with the actual ultimate outcome; and looking 
at how violence affects long-run development, and (related to the second front), through 
what mechanisms this happens. In addition, we also expect to see the introduction of 
more  structural  and  game  theoretic  modeling  strategies  with  an  eye  on  empirical 
applications.  
                                                 
18 Nuñez and Sánchez, 2001 and Dube and Vargas, 2008. 
19 Vargas, 2011. 
20 Díaz and Sánchez, 2004.   14 
We believe this is an ambitious agenda, but we anticipate that it will not remain 
unfulfilled. In fact the pool of economists (both local and foreigners) interested on the 
topic is growing every day. We foresee that studies in the areas suggested will soon 
proliferate: As a case study that combines a long-lasting history of violence with the 
availability  of  reliable  micro  data,  Colombia  can  become  a  source  of  the  academic 
output that can guide how research on conflicts, crime and civil wars shifts from cross-
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